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A Matter of Law: The Non-Violent
Homosexual Advance Defense Is
Insufficient Evidence of Provocation
By ALEXIS KENT*
Broward Circuit Judge Daniel Futch, in a case where a gay man was beaten
to death outside a gay bar: “That’s a crime now, to beat up a homosexual?”
The prosecutor: “Yes, sir. And it’s a crime to kill them.” Judge Futch:
“Times really have changed.”1
Introduction
AN ARCHAIC THEORY exists in the law today that recognizes a non-
violent homosexual advance as legally sufficient provocation to reduce
murder to manslaughter.2 Consider the following: a competitive kick-
boxer in his twenties, a known homophobe, accompanied a man in
his seventies to his hotel room, on the older man’s promise to help
him find a job.3 The younger man knew the older man to be a homo-
sexual from earlier comments.4 Police later found the older man sav-
agely murdered with his wallet missing.5 When caught, the younger
man claimed the older man, described by others as gentle and dod-
* Alexis (the author, Miss Kent, whichever you prefer) graduated summa cum laude
from John Jay College of Criminal Justice in Manhattan, and magna cum laude from the
University of San Francisco School of Law. She truly enjoys studying and analyzing the law,
but prefers to spend her free time studying and analyzing Barbara Streisand, Judy Garland,
and the San Francisco Giants. Alexis would like to thank her wife, Pegah, for her
enthusiasm and support during the writing and publication of this piece, and always.
1. Robert B. Mison, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insuffi-
cient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133, 163 (1992).
2. See id. at 134.
3. People v. Cain, No. D036023, 2002 WL 1767583, at *3. (Cal. Ct. App. July 31,
2002).
4. Id.
5. Id. at *1–2.
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dering, sexually attacked him.6 At trial, he raised a provocation de-
fense testifying that he had blacked out and had attacked the old man
out of fear.7 The judge gave the manslaughter instruction to the jury
on this evidence.8
In all likelihood, the defendant went to the old man’s room to
rob him. While it is possible the gentle old man made a pass at the
defendant, it is highly unlikely the pass was violent in nature. Most acts
accepted as legally adequate provocation require violence by the vic-
tim that provokes the killer.9 Yet, California courts have consistently
given the manslaughter instruction if the murderer was “provoked” by
a non-violent homosexual advance.10 This Comment argues a non-vio-
lent sexual advance of one man upon another man by definition in-
volves no violence and should not be considered an act legally
sufficient to provoke the reasonable man to murder. Nor should the
manslaughter instruction be sent to the jury on such flimsy and un-
likely “evidence” of violence. Courts should require a violent act on
the part of the victim before giving a jury the manslaughter instruc-
tion and should abolish the non-violent homosexual advance defense
as legally sufficient provocation. Part I outlines provocation in Califor-
nia. Part II discusses the evolution of the non-violent homosexual ad-
vance defense, and Part III follows with a discussion of cases in
California that showcases the way the defense has been used. Part IV
analyzes whether murder is a “reasonable” reaction to a non-violent
homosexual advance. This Comment concludes by offering an answer
to this problem of institutionalized homophobia.
I. Provocation in California
Voluntary manslaughter is an intentional killing that lacks mal-
ice11 because the killing occurred under circumstances of sufficient
provocation such as to rouse a reasonable person to a fit of passion.12
6. Id. at *3.
7. Id.
8. Id. at *4.
9. See infra note 30 and accompanying text. California cases have found mere words R
or gestures can rise to the level of adequate provocation. This author strongly disagrees
and advocates that only a violent act by the victim should be sufficient to warrant a man-
slaughter instruction by the judge.
10. See infra notes 29, 31. R
11. Malice can either be express or implied. CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West 2008).
“It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the
life of a fellow creature. It is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or when
the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.” Id.
12. People v. Breverman, 960 P.2d 1094, 1106 (Cal. 1998).
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The provoking act “must be of the character and degree as naturally
would excite and arouse the passion, and the assailant must act under
the influence of that sudden quarrel or heat of passion.”13 If the prov-
ocation was such that it would cause “an ordinary person of average
disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection,”
then the killing will be reduced from murder to manslaughter.14 The
defendant must actually kill in the heat of passion,15 otherwise, “if suf-
ficient time has elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow
for passion to subside and reason to return, the killing is not voluntary
manslaughter.”16
The test for sufficient provocation consists of four parts: (1) le-
gally sufficient provocation existed; (2) a reasonable person in similar
circumstances would have been tempted to react as the defendant
did; (3) the defendant acted due to this passion; and (4) the defen-
dant did not have time to cool off.17 “While no specific type of provo-
cation is required, slight or remote provocation is not sufficient.”18
California has not enumerated by statute the acts that constitute
sufficient provocation.19 However, California courts have historically
limited legally adequate provocation to select categories: (1) a violent
assault or battery by the victim; (2) mutual combat; (3) murder of a
family member; (4) illegal arrest; and (5) a wife’s adultery.20 These
categories are remnants of the English common law and yet, today,
13. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 8.42 (2009) [hereinafter CALJIC].
14. People v. Manriquez, 123 P.3d 614, 640 (Cal. 2005); see CALJIC 8.42 (2009).
15. Manriquez, 123 P.3d at 640. Hence, it is possible for the defendant to have subjec-
tively acted under the color of passion, but, because his reaction to the provoking act was
not one a reasonable person in similar circumstances would have had, he has not met the
objective component of the heat of passion requirement. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West
2008).
16. People v. Wickersham, 650 P.2d 311, 321 (Cal. 1982).
17. Id.
18. CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 603 (2008).
19. People v. Ashland, 128 P. 798, 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 1912) (“[N]o particular cause
for such heat of passion is expressly prescribed by our law.”).
20. People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976) (finding a wife’s adultery was adequate
to provoke killing); People v. Elmore, 138 P. 989 (Cal. 1914) (finding a violent assault by
the victim as adequate provocation); People v. Freel, 48 Cal. 436 (1874) (finding a quarrel
was sufficient provocation); People v. Brooks, 230 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Ct. App. 1986) (finding
murder of a family member as legally sufficient provocation); see 1 B.E. WITKIN ET AL.,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENSES, § 214 (3d ed. Supp. 2008) (stating an illegal arrest is
no longer facially sufficient).
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they are still considered legally adequate provocation to give a jury the
manslaughter instruction.21
The first four of the five categories require violence or the threat
of violence to satisfy the sufficiency prong of the provocation test.22
The inclusion of the last category—a wife’s adultery (and a non-vio-
lent homosexual advance)—rests on society’s perception of the immo-
rality and wrongness of the victim’s “provoking” act.23 This approach
partially blames the victim for his or her own death24 despite the total
lack of violence on the part of the victim.25
The earliest California Supreme Court cases indicated that where
the provocation defense is used, violence must be an element of the
provocative act.26 In People v. Freel,27 the court held that “when the
mortal blow is struck in the heat of passion, excited by a quarrel, sud-
den, and of sufficient violence to amount to adequate provocation, the law,
out of forbearance for the weakness of human nature, will disregard
the actual intent and will reduce the offense to manslaughter.”28 The
court’s language is clear—violence is a necessary element of the pro-
vocative act.29 Some violence or, at the very least, some threat of vio-
21. Christina Pei-Lin Chen, Provocation’s Privileged Desire: The Provocation Doctrine, “Ho-
mosexual Panic,” and the Non-Violent Unwanted Sexual Advance Defense, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 195, 207 (2000).
22. A. J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292, 293 (1976).
23. See id. at 294.
24. Justification theory denies the murderer’s reactions were wrong and views “the
victim’s wrongful conduct [as the cause of] the defendant’s violent outburst.” Mison, supra
note 1, at 146. “A defendant’s reaction is partially justified when the victim’s behavior is R
wrongful in light of the ‘prevailing cultural climate.’ Likewise, only if the provoking act
would make the ‘ordinary law-abiding person’ angry will a defendant’s behavior be par-
tially excused.” Id. at 147. This analysis casts an often harmless come-on as wrong and
unacceptable, and that position should be unacceptable as a matter of law. See infra Part
IV for an analysis of the excuse versus justification argument.
25. A wife’s adultery (i.e., the oldest form of provocation) as legally adequate provoca-
tion has been highly criticized. See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men
Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 71 (1992); Laurie J. Taylor,
Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33
UCLA L. REV. 1679, 1693–97 (1986). See generally Emily L. Miller, (Wo)Manslaughter: Volun-
tary Manslaughter, Gender, and the Model Penal Code, 50 EMORY L.J. 665 (2001) (This author
believes discovery of adultery should not be considered provocation sufficient to mitigate
murder to manslaughter. That discussion, however, is outside the scope of this
Comment.).
26. See People v. Freel, 48 Cal. 436,  437 (1874).
27. Id.
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. However, near the time of Freel, courts allowed mitigation of murder charges to
manslaughter upon a finding of adultery involving no violence. People v. Logan, 164 P.
1121, 1123 (Cal. 1917). “Thus the sight of a wife in adultery, or even a reasonable belief
that [the defendant’s] wife was committing an act of adultery, although the belief may be
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lence should be required before society sanctions the violent
homophobic reaction of the defendant and reduces a murder charge
to a manslaughter conviction. However, some California courts have
found words or gestures by themselves, or coupled with other circum-
stances, may be sufficient to provoke a reasonable person to kill.30
II. The Evolution of the Non-Violent Homosexual Advance
Defense
In California, a non-violent homosexual advance on a straight
man, whether it is real, perceived, or concocted, has been considered
evidence of provocation sufficient to send the manslaughter instruc-
tion to the jury.31 A judge will instruct the jury that if it finds the de-
fendant reacted in a way that the ordinary reasonable man would have
acted under the same circumstances, it cannot convict him of murder.
This is referred to as the non-violent homosexual advance defense
(“NHA”).32 The defense has been argued in cases where it is unclear
whether the trial court instructed the jury on voluntary manslaugh-
ter.33 The provocation doctrine is wholly derived from the common
law in California; the legislature has yet to act on the subject.34
unfounded, has been held sufficient evidence to go to the jury as creating ‘the heat of
passion’ in the mind of the defendant.” Id.
30. See People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 779–81 (Cal. 1976) (reversing murder convic-
tion for failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter where defendant was taunted by his
wife with her infidelity for two straight weeks directly after marriage; alternatively she
would demand sex, after which she would again swear she was in love with another man
and would leave defendant). But see People v. Lucas, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 282, 293 (Ct. App.
1997) (denying the defense a provocation instruction where defendant shot occupants of
car next to him on the highway for giving him dirty looks and yelling out names). This
author believes that when provocation is the proffered defense, the defendant must prove
the victim violently provoked his own demise. However, a broad discussion of the provoca-
tion defense is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a discussion of the doctrine, see
Joshua Dressler, Criminal Law: Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982), and Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation De-
fense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959 (2002).
31. See People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627, 642 (Cal. 1989); People v. Cornett, 212 Cal. Rptr.
24, 25–26 (Ct. App. 1985) (defendant charged with murder but pled guilty to voluntary
manslaughter); People v. Long, 113 Cal. Rptr. 530, 532–34 (Ct. App. 1974); People v. Cain,
No. D036023, 2002 WL 1767583 (Cal. Ct. App. July 31, 2002); People v. Estrada, No.
D036756, 2002 WL 31319735 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2002).
32. See infra Part III.
33. People v. Reyes, 526 P.2d 225, 229–30, 235–36 (Cal. 1974); People v. Green, 302
P.2d 307, 310–11, 313–14 (Cal. 1956); People v. Tapia, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 851, 853, 858–61
(Ct. App. 1994); People v. Stoltz, 16 Cal. Rptr. 285, 285–87 (Ct. App. 1961); People v.
Taylor, 11 Cal. Rptr. 480, 481–82 (Ct. App. 1961).
34. People v. Ashland, 128 P. 798, 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 1912) (“[N]o particular cause
for such heat of passion is expressly prescribed by our law.”).
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NHA evolved out of the so-called Homosexual Panic Defense
(“HPD”), a panic that came about when a man sexually approached
by another man had an intense reaction resulting in a murderous re-
sponse, due to his own repressed homosexual tendencies.35 According
to one psychiatrist, Dr. Edward Kempf, HPD occurred in men who
were afraid of being exposed as homosexual and repressed their feel-
ings, resulting in delusions and hallucinations.36 Repressing these
feelings, according to Dr. Kempf, could cause panic, anxiety, visions,
voices, trance-like states, and other phenomena.37 A man suffering an
extreme homosexual panic episode might react aggressively towards
others out of an acute fear of being exposed.38 Dr. Kempf developed
the theory during his observations of World War I soldiers who had
allegedly suffered homosexual panic during or directly after the war.39
He theorized the panic occurred after the men were grouped to-
gether alone for long periods of time.40
Later psychiatrists characterized the reaction as a temporary ma-
nic insanity occurring when the repressed homosexual’s tendencies
toward other men is inadvertently activated and the man experiencing
these feelings can no longer pretend to be unaware.41 This signified
the medical community’s shift from viewing the panic as an internal
struggle to viewing it as a reaction caused by an external actor.42
Though HPD was not officially raised as a legal defense in Califor-
nia until 1967,43 California defendants had argued self-defense in re-
action to a homosexual advance as early as 1949.44 In People v. Zatzke,45
the defendant pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, but
the insanity plea was withdrawn following trial.46 The defendant
claimed his roommate, Dyer, got into bed with him and then proposi-
tioned him, to which he replied “he didn’t go for that damn stuff.”47
35. Chen, supra note 21, at 200. R
36. Id. (citing 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOMOSEXUALITY 941–43 (Wayne R. Dynes et al. eds.,
1990)).
37. Chen, supra note 21, at 200. R
38. Id.
39. Robert G. Bagnall, Patrick C. Gallagher & Joni L. Goldstein, Burdens on Gay Liti-
gants and Bias in the Court System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 497, 499 (1984).
40. Id.
41. See Chen, supra note 21, at 200; see also Bagnall et al., supra note 39, at 499–500. R
42. Chen, supra note 21, at 200. R
43. People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (Ct. App. 1967).
44. People v. Zatzke, 202 P. 2d 1009 (Cal. 1949).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1010 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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According to Zatzke, he got a hammer out of the dresser drawer and
told Dyer that if he tried it again, he would kill him.48 Dyer kept com-
ing, so Zatzke hit him several times with the hammer. Even as Dyer
was trying to pull himself up on the bed, pleading for help, Zatzke
struck the fatal blow just to put him out of his misery.49 At trial, Zatzke
argued Dyer was attempting to commit an act of sodomy upon him,
and he necessarily reacted in self-defense.50 Unfortunately for Zatzke,
evidence was introduced (over objection on grounds of relevance)
that he had had an ongoing homosexual relationship in the past and
so could not have been averse to the victim’s advances.51 His convic-
tion for first-degree murder was affirmed on appeal.52
The defense in Zatzke seems mischaracterized as self-defense be-
cause the elements to argue homosexual panic were present: (1) de-
fendant had previous homosexual encounters he was likely ashamed
of (or at least did not want revealed); (2) he was faced with an oppor-
tunity to engage in such activities again; and (3) he killed in reaction.
However, homosexual panic was not argued. HPD was first officially
raised in People v. Rodriguez,53 where the defendant beat an old man
with a stick after the man grabbed him from behind in an alley.54
After the murder, and under police interrogation, the defendant
claimed he had been with two other boys, and one of the other boys
attacked the man while the defendant unsuccessfully tried to stop the
fight.55 At trial, the defendant changed his story, claiming he had
feared the man would molest him and reacted in an uncontrollable
rage of homosexual panic. The defendant’s conflicting statement was
used to impeach him, and the jury ultimately ignored the defense,
convicting the defendant of second-degree murder.56
HPD has been justified under the larger category of diminished
capacity defenses—e.g., a mental defect, trauma, or intoxication that
prevents a defendant from forming the requisite intent for murder.57
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1015.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1011.
53. 64 Cal. Rptr. 253 (Ct. App. 1967).
54. Id. at 255.
55. Id. at 256.
56. Id. at 254.
57. The defense of diminished capacity has been abolished in California. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 25 (West 2008). California law now provides:
The defense of diminished capacity is hereby abolished. In a criminal action . . .
evidence concerning an accused person’s intoxication, trauma, mental illness,
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Diminished capacity defenses negate mens rea, so HPD acted similarly
to other diminished capacity defenses.58 Use of HPD was reserved for
those considered to have the psychiatric illness of homosexuality. In
1973, the American Psychiatric Association demedicalized homosexu-
ality,59 making the future use of HPD problematic. Due to these
changes, HPD and its variations are now raised as provocation de-
fenses rather than diminished capacity defenses.60
One variation of the defense, the “trans” panic defense, was used
successfully by the killers of Gwen Araujo. In 2002, four young men
found out their lover, Gwen,61 was biologically Eddie, and they bru-
tally killed her.62 One of the boys pled guilty and testified against his
friends; another claimed he only helped bury Gwen in her shallow
grave.63 The remaining two defendants argued they had panicked af-
ter learning Gwen was biologically male and killed her in a rage.64
Jurors deadlocked over murder charges, and the judge declared a mis-
trial. Upon retrial, the two defendants were convicted of murder and
a third pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter.65 Even though
the evidence showed the defendants were not homophobic nor had
ever exhibited anti-gay attitudes,66 historically a key element of HPD,
the defendants nevertheless apparently presented sufficient evi-
dence67 for the judge to give the jury the manslaughter instruction.
disease, or defect shall not be admissible to show or negate capacity to form the
particular purpose, intent, motive, malice aforethought, knowledge, or other
mental state required for the commission of the crime charged.
Id. The use of diminished capacity came under intense scrutiny when former San Francisco
Supervisor Dan White shot and killed Mayor George Moscone and out homosexual Super-
visor Harvey Milk. Though White packed extra bullets, climbed through a window at City
Hall to avoid detection of his fire arm, and shot both men nine times, he was only con-
victed of voluntary manslaughter. His attorneys argued White was depressed from losing
his job and sustained himself only on junk food (the “Twinkie” defense) to the point of
creating a chemical imbalance in his brain, which prevented him from premeditating mur-
der. Cornell University Law School Legal Information Institute, www.law.cornell.edu/back
ground/insane/capacity.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2009).
58. Chen, supra note 21, at 202. R
59. Id.
60. Victoria L. Steinberg, A Heat of Passion Offense: Emotions and Bias in “Trans Panic”
Mitigation Claims, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 499 (2005).
61. Id. at 502.
62. Id. at 500.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Bradford Bigler, Sexually Provoked: Recognizing Sexual Misrepresentation as Adequate
Provocation, 53 UCLA L. REV. 783, 784 n.1 (2006).
66. Id. at 797.
67. See infra Part IV.
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Originally, the defendants had attempted to raise HPD as an in-
sanity defense with the goal of “complete exoneration from criminal
responsibility and punishment.”68 Fortunately:
Cases involving the defense of homosexual panic which have
reached the appellate level have never resulted in a defendant’s
acquittal by reason of insanity. Neither have the cases turned on
this issue standing alone. Nevertheless, no court has barred the de-
fense, either as a matter of law, or because it rests on an untenable
psychological theory, or because it is an unwarranted extension of
the insanity defense.69
Even so, defendants continue to use HPD.70
The shift from HPD to the NHA defense may have been due to
the fact that homosexual panic only affects latent homosexuals.71
Given the option, most defendants would likely rather plead blind
rage and heat of passion than to admit having homosexual
tendencies.
III. The Non-Violent Homosexual Advance Defense in
California
A discussion of two recent cases demonstrates how NHA works in
practice. Recall the earlier discussion of self-defense in Zatzke.72 The
difficulty in Zatke resurfaces in the cases that follow; it is impossible to
know whether the advance really did occur, or whether the defendant
(or his attorney) simply believed a jury would excuse the defendant’s
behavior based on the perceived insult to his manhood or, perhaps,
the jury’s own homophobia.73 “Defendants can manipulate [NHA] to
their advantage, raise it knowing that they did not act in the heat of
passion, hoping to distract juries and garner sympathy by capitalizing
68. Chen, supra note 21, at 201; see People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253 (Ct. App. R
1967).
69. Bagnall et al., supra note 39, at 501. R
70. See People v. Schmitz, 586 N.W.2d 766 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). Schmitz claimed a
version of HPD after his friend, Amedure, confessed a crush on him on the Jenny Jones
show. Three days later, Schmitz purchased a shotgun, drove to Amedure’s trailer, and shot
him twice through the heart. The jury convicted him only of second-degree murder. Id. See
also Kara S. Suffredini, Pride and Prejudice: The Homosexual Panic Defense, 21 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 279, 279–80 (2001).
71. It has been noted, however, that defendants claiming homosexual panic have
failed to plead their reaction was caused by their own repressed homosexual tendencies.
Suffredini, supra note 70, at 293. R
72. See supra Part II.
73. See Mison, supra note 1, at 147–58 for an excellent, though slightly outdated, R
discussion of institutionalized homophobia.
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on juries’ conscious or unconscious homophobia.”74 Equally troubling
is the fact that defendants who raise NHA almost never allege a violent
assault by the victim. Violence, and not a homosexual advance, should
be the element in these situations that triggers a manslaughter in-
struction. However, evidence that the victim violently provoked his
own death is scant, if not non-existent.
In People v. Cain,75 a twenty-four-year-old competitive kick-boxer
with a known hatred of homosexuals used the NHA defense by claim-
ing he had killed a seventy-three-year-old professor out of fear.76 The
victim, Keith Runcorn, was a seventy-three-year-old openly gay geo-
physicist.77 At trial, he was described by a member of his gym as a
“fairly large but very gentle, docile, ‘doddering, old man.’”78 The mur-
der occurred in San Diego, while Runcorn was on a business trip.79
During his trip, Runcorn spent time with Douglas Meier, a man he
had known for nearly twenty years.80 Though Meier was thirty-three
years younger, he and Runcorn had an ongoing sexual relationship
which consisted of wrestling in bikini briefs, watching videos of nude
male wrestling, and having sex.81 Meier testified he sometimes de-
clined Runcorn’s sexual advances, and Runcorn never forced him or
used obscene language.82 On December 4, 1995, the day before
Runcorn’s murder, the two men met at Runcorn’s hotel room,
watched videos, and were intimate.83
The following day, Runcorn was found dead in his hotel room,
fully clothed.84 He had a strap from his luggage tied around his neck,
was badly beaten about his head, face, neck, and shoulders, and had
defensive wounds on his forearms and the back of his hand.85 The
victim’s wallet was missing but a pager belonging to the defendant
Cain, who had a room near the victim, was found in Runcorn’s
room.86 Cain had checked out on the night of the murder and had
rented a room at a nearby hotel under the name Carlisi, Cain’s in-
74. Id. at 167.
75. No. D036023, 2002 WL 1767583 (Cal. Ct. App. July 31, 2002).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at *4.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at *1.
82. Id.
83. Id. at *2.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
\\server05\productn\S\SAN\44-1\SAN106.txt unknown Seq: 11  2-OCT-09 12:11
Summer 2009] HOMOSEXUAL ADVANCE DEFENSE AND PROVOCATION 165
structor in a bartending course.87 The police contacted Carlisi, and
Cain was eventually arrested in Mexico at the request of San Diego
police.88
At trial, two bits of evidence against Cain were particularly damn-
ing. First, his former teacher testified that Cain had said on several
occasions that if a man ever made a homosexual advance on him he
would “beat them . . . senseless” or “f—-ing kill them, [by] smash[ing]
in their face . . . .”89 Second, Cain’s former cellmate testified90 that
Cain expressed a violent aversion towards homosexuals, and also ad-
mitted to killing and robbing a professor in his hotel room after pro-
positioning him to get him alone in his hotel room, recounting the
exact details of the way Runcorn’s body was found.91
Cain testified he met Runcorn at the hotel restaurant, and
Runcorn told him he was a retired professor and could help Cain get
a job.92 Cain suspected Runcorn’s homosexuality from his apprecia-
tive comments on Cain’s build.93 Cain testified that when they arrived
at the room, Runcorn pushed him onto the bed, and said “[y]ou know
you want it, you want to suck my dick.”94 Cain testified that when
Runcorn grabbed him by the shirt he feared he was going to be
raped.95 He then punched Runcorn, and Runcorn fought back, caus-
ing Cain to black out and experience “black rage.”96 When he came
to, Runcorn lay beaten with the strap around his neck; Cain
remembered nothing.97
The first trial resulted in a mistrial. In the second trial, an appel-
late court reversed Cain’s first-degree murder and robbery conviction.
The third trial finally resulted in a conviction of second-degree mur-
der. Cain’s conviction for second-degree murder was upheld on ap-
peal.98 Cain’s testimony that he feared Runcorn would rape him
should have prevented the judge, as a matter of law, from issuing the
manslaughter instruction. Only when the judge believes the evidence
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. The former cellmate stated he was testifying because it was the right thing to do,
not for protective custody or benefit from the District Attorney or the police. Id. at *3.
91. Id. at *2.
92. Id.
93. Id. at *3.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at *1.
\\server05\productn\S\SAN\44-1\SAN106.txt unknown Seq: 12  2-OCT-09 12:11
166 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
of provocation is such that a reasonable jury could convict of man-
slaughter should the instruction be given.99 Not only might such bla-
tant lies prejudice the jury, but they implant in the collective mind of
the jury that the defendant was afraid and possibly not acting deliber-
ately. Ultimately, the jury failed to convict Cain of first-degree murder.
The trial court instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter
with the 1989 revision of CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL
8.40, which read:
Every person who unlawfully kills another human being with-
out malice aforethought but with an intent to kill, is guilty of volun-
tary manslaughter . . . .
There is no malice aforethought if the killing occurred upon
a sudden quarrel or heat of passion or in the actual but unreasona-
ble belief in the necessity to defend oneself . . . .
In order to prove this crime, each of the following elements
must be proved: 1, A human being was killed; 2, The killing was
unlawful; and, 3, The killing was done with the intent to kill.100
Murder is an unlawful killing with malice aforethought.101 Malice
may be either express or implied.102 Manslaughter is defined as an
unlawful killing that lacks malice.103 To be guilty of voluntary man-
slaughter and not murder, the defendant must have acted in “a sud-
den quarrel or heat of passion.”104 The jury was also instructed that
99. People v. Breverman, 960 P.2d 1094, 1106 (Cal. 1998).
100. Cain, 2002 WL 1767583, at *4 (emphasis added in Cain).
101. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 2008).
102. Cain, 2002 WL 1767583, at *7 (internal citations omitted).
103. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 2008).
104. Id. A month after Cain was found guilty, the California Supreme Court found it
erroneous to instruct that voluntary manslaughter requires intent to kill, because a convic-
tion for voluntary manslaughter may also lie when the death results from an unintentional
killing caused by an act committed with a conscious disregard for human life. Cain, 2002
WL 1767583, at *5; People v. Lasko, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 441 (Ct. App. 2000); People v. Blakely,
96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451 (Ct. App. 2000).
This erroneous instruction created the issue that while a defendant who killed in the
heat of passion with the intent to kill would be guilty of voluntary manslaughter, a defen-
dant who unintentionally killed in the heat of passion but with a conscious disregard for
life could not be guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Lasko, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445–47;
Blakely, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455. To remedy the above, the Supreme Court held that volun-
tary manslaughter does not require an intent to kill and instructing so was error. Lasko, 96
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447–48.
The instruction now provides that to prove voluntary manslaughter, four elements
must be proved: (1) a human being was killed; (2) the killing was unlawful; (3) the perpe-
trator of the killing either intended to kill the victim or acted in conscious disregard for
life; and (4) the perpetrator’s conduct resulted in the unlawful killing. CALJIC 8.40
(2004). Though the jury in Cain’s case should have been told the intent to kill element can
be established either by express intent to kill or by an act with conscious disregard for life,
the court found the error harmless. Cain, 2002 WL 1767583, at *7.
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the offense is manslaughter when the killing “is done in the heat of
passion or is excited by a sudden quarrel such as amounts to adequate
provocation. . . . In such a case, even if an intent to kill exists, the law
is that malice, which is an essential element of murder, is absent.”105
Finally, the jury was properly instructed that the People have the bur-
den of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was not pro-
voked by a quarrel or done in the heat of passion.106 The appellate
court found the jury was properly instructed and gave serious consid-
eration before finding that Cain committed second-degree murder.107
Though the result in this case was a second-degree murder con-
viction, this author believes—and the court implied—Cain should
have been convicted of first-degree murder.108 First, the court noted
that evidence in the case “strongly suggested a calculated intent to
kill,” followed by a graphic description of the force used upon
Runcorn.109 The court then noted the evidence of provocation was
weak, and “Cain, a 24-year-old competitive kickboxer, would not likely
feel a need—reasonable or unreasonable—to defend himself against
a 73-year-old professor, who, while in good condition for his age, was
also described as stooped, slow, gentle[,] and doddering.”110
In all likelihood, the trial court’s voluntary manslaughter instruc-
tion, prompted by Cain’s extremely weak evidence of provocation,
kept the jury from a first-degree murder conviction. In the court’s
own words, “it is not reasonably probable that a properly instructed
jury would have convicted Cain of the lesser offense of voluntary man-
slaughter.”111 The appellate court rightly criticized the trial court,
considering there was no evidence the victim had used force or
threatened violence or in any way posed a threat against the mur-
derer—a trained kickboxer nearly fifty years his junior. Violence by
the victim should always be present in order to instruct the jury on
manslaughter in provocation cases, otherwise the personal bias or
prejudice of the jury is allowed to affect the sentence of the
murderer.112
105. Cain, 2002 WL 1767583, at *5 (citing CALJIC 8.50 (2009)).
106. Cain, 2002 WL 1767583, at *6; CALJIC 8.50 (2009).
107. Cain, 2002 WL 1767583, at *6.
108. Id. (“Given the strength of the evidence indicating that the killing was not only
intentional but premeditated, Cain could have been, but was not, convicted of first degree
murder.”).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See infra Part III.
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In People v. Estrada,113 the victim, Dennis Morgan, was found
stabbed to death in his parents’ driveway.114 His wallet and parents’
car were missing.115 There was blood inside the house that someone
had tried to clean, and the defendant’s fingerprints were pulled from
a bottle of rug cleaner.116 Before the victim’s body was found, Border
Patrol agents stopped the defendant, Estrada, while driving the stolen
car, which had blood on the roof.117 The car had not yet been re-
ported stolen so the agents eventually released Estrada.118 Estrada
traveled to his sister’s house, who, assumed the car was stolen, and
reported him to the police. Estrada was arrested when he arrived at
his girlfriend’s home.119
Estrada initially admitted knowing the car was stolen, and even
that it came from Morgan, but told police another man had killed
Morgan.120 Eventually, Estrada told the police Morgan had picked
him up while he was hitchhiking and invited Estrada to come to his
house for drinks.121 Estrada told police that when the two men were at
Morgan’s home, Morgan asked Estrada for oral sex and Estrada re-
fused.122 Estrada said he tried to leave, but when Morgan persisted he
stabbed him with a kitchen knife.123 He did not stab Morgan out of
fear, but rather because he was offended by Morgan’s requests.124 Es-
trada told police Morgan was not aggressive nor a bad person; he was
“nice people.”125
Estrada’s defense at trial was more elaborate. He testified that af-
ter Morgan picked him up hitchhiking, he told Estrada he was not
going in Estrada’s direction but rather home, and if Estrada could
wait until morning he would help him get a bus ticket.126 Estrada said,
while at the house, Morgan asked him where they could get some
113. No. D036756, 2002 WL 31319735 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2002).
114. Id. at *1.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at *2.
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methamphetamine, and Estrada told him he did not know.127 Morgan
asked Estrada for oral sex, and Estrada simply refused and went into
the bathroom.128 Estrada testified that when he came out of the bath-
room, Morgan grabbed him, threw him onto the bed, then jumped on
him and grabbed his penis.129 Estrada punched Morgan in the face
and pushed him off. He went back into the living room and continued
drinking.130 Morgan came into the room several minutes later with his
erect penis exposed telling Estrada he wanted to engage in oral sex.131
Estrada claimed Morgan tried to put his penis in Estrada’s face, so he
broke a drinking glass on Morgan’s forehead.132 Estrada testified that
while Morgan had an icepack on his face, Estrada called his girlfriend
to tell her what was happening and that he was leaving.133 As he
stepped outside, Morgan blocked him and told him he could not
leave.134 Estrada testified he was scared, so he went to the kitchen and
grabbed a knife.135 He went back out and told the victim to stay away
from him. Morgan tried to grab the knife, and Estrada to swung it at
Morgan. Estrada did not know whether he had made contact.136 Mor-
gan paused, then lunged at him and impaled himself on the knife
Estrada was holding.137 Estrada got some paper towels for Morgan and
tried to help him stop the bleeding.138 He then went inside to clean
the blood in the house with rug cleaner.139 When he offered Morgan
a ride to the hospital, Morgan declined.140 Morgan eventually became
unconscious and fell face down in the driveway. Estrada fled, and took
Morgan’s wallet and keys with him.141
At trial, two other men testified that Morgan had previously made
persistent but non-violent homosexual advances toward them.142 Wit-
127. Id. The toxicology report done on the victim showed methamphetamine in his
system, and the toxicologist testified this substance can cause a person to become excitable
and sometimes irrational. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at *3.
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ness Adams testified he had met Morgan at a restaurant in 1978.143
Shortly after meeting, Adams invited Morgan to his home to smoke
marijuana.144 While there, Morgan asked Adams for oral sex, and Ad-
ams refused.145 Morgan asked if he could at least see Adams’ penis,
and Adams again refused and left the room.146 Morgan followed him,
and Adams had to tell Morgan twice to go and sit down before Mor-
gan complied.147 Adams described Morgan as persistent, but not vio-
lent, and said he did not have to use physical force to stop Morgan.148
A second witness, Lay, testified he, Morgan, and two other men
were staying at a hotel in Palm Desert in 1986 or 1987, two men to a
room.149 Lay testified that though he and Morgan were not sharing a
room, Morgan came into his room, got on his bed, and tried to unbut-
ton Lay’s pants.150 Lay understood Morgan wanted to have oral sex
and yelled at him to leave the room.151 Two hours later, Morgan came
back and tried again.152 Lay testified that only after he shoved Morgan
against the wall hard enough to make hole in the wall did Morgan
leave.153 Lay stated Morgan was not violent, and he was not afraid of
him.154 A jury ultimately convicted Estrada of second-degree murder
even though they were given the manslaughter instruction.155
At trial, the prosecutor introduced evidence that Estrada had
robbed a man named Sinclair whom he had met under circumstances
similar to the way he had met Morgan.156 Estrada was hitchhiking, and
Sinclair gave him a ride.157 Estrada directed Sinclair to an isolated
place, threatened him, and robbed him of his money and ATM
card.158 This evidence was ruled admissible by the trial court under
California Evidence Code section 1101(b), where prior crimes or bad
acts can be offered not to prove likelihood of guilt, but to show a
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at *1.
156. Id. at *8–9.
157. Id.
158. Id. Sinclair testified at trial that Estrada tried to take his car keys, but it is unclear
whether the defendant was successful. Id.
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common plan or particular intent, or to show the defendant had a
certain signature way of committing crimes.159 The prosecutor at-
tempted to prove a special circumstance that Estrada committed the
murder in the course of a robbery, which would warrant a first-degree
murder conviction under California’s felony murder doctrine.160 The
jury determined instead that Estrada had not intended to rob the vic-
tim until after he stabbed and killed him.161
Unlike Cain, there was evidence the victim was sexually aggres-
sive. It is disturbing that the defendant’s story at trial was markedly
different from his statement to the police that the victim was not ag-
gressive, and that he had stabbed him because he was offended by
Morgan’s sexual advances.162 Still, Estrada’s testimony at trial did not
establish that the victim’s advances on him were violent nor caused
him to become enraged and act violently. The defendant’s testimony
was that the victim propositioned him repeatedly, and at times was
aggressive. If an aggressive come-on alone was sufficient provocation
to mitigate murder to manslaughter, women approached by aggres-
sive, drunk men might rethink their responses.163
The aggressive sexual behavior by the victim was corroborated,
but the People also presented evidence that the victim was not violent
in nature, including the defendant’s own statement that the victim did
not act violently. Estrada is a key example of when the court should
rule as a matter of law that the victim’s actions were not legally suffi-
cient provocation. The judge heard evidence that the victim acted ag-
gressively, yet there was no evidence of violence. Estrada’s own
testimony of the victim’s aggressive come-ons was at odds with his
statement to police that the victim did not act violently.
159. Id. at *8; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(b) (West 2008).
160. Estrada, 2002 WL 31319735, at *9; CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2008).
161. Estrada, 2002 WL 31319735, at *9.
162. Id. at *1.
163. However, the literature resoundingly tells us that women do not kill in response to
unwanted sexual advances. “Women rarely kill . . . [and when they do,] [f]emale homicide
is so different from male homicide that women and men may be said to live in two differ-
ent cultures, each with its own subculture of violence.” Taylor, supra note 25, at 1680–81 R
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]omen, as homicide perpetrators, rarely kill when
‘provoked’ because, as currently defined, adequate provocation and passionate ‘human’
weakness reflect a male view of understandable homicidal violence. Chen, supra note 21, at R
219. “[A]lthough violent loss of self-control is a human failing, it is particularly a male
weakness, which may cast further doubt on the legitimacy of the [NHA] defense in the eyes
of some people.” Joshua Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men: Reflections
on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the “Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 726, 729 (1995).
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The facts from Zatzke, Cain, and Estrada are disturbing. More dis-
turbing is that the judge in each case gave the manslaughter instruc-
tion. Judges are not required to instruct on lesser included offenses,
such as manslaughter, unless there is an evidentiary basis for such in-
struction.164 “[T]he existence of any evidence, no matter how weak,
will not justify instructions on a lesser included offense, but such in-
structions are required whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty
only of the lesser offense is substantial enough to merit consideration
by the jury.”165 Instruction of the lesser offense is only appropriate
when evidence and testimony are substantial enough that a reasona-
ble jury could find only the lesser, not the greater, offense was
committed.166
Applying the substantial evidence standard to the facts of Estrada,
it appears the trial judge believed a reasonable jury could find the
defendant was guilty only of manslaughter, and not murder. Recall
the testimony of witnesses Lay and Adams in Estrada. Both testified
that although the victim’s sexual come-ons were aggressive, they were
by no means violent. The jury, having received this instruction, was
then free to find the victim’s sexual advance provoked his own de-
mise, even despite other testimony that Morgan was not a violent man.
The jury did not reduce the charge in Estrada. However, in the ab-
stract, NHA permits defendants to argue they should be excused for
killing due to the victim’s non-violent behavior. Violence is required
in almost every other area of the provocation defense. The legally so-
phisticated trial judge must act as a screen and prevent the man-
slaughter instruction from being heard by the jury when there is not
sufficient evidence.167 When the jury is given the manslaughter in-
struction, the individual biases and prejudices of the jurors may cause
them to misapply the “reasonable man” standard.
164. People v. Breverman, 960 P.2d 1094, 1106 (Cal. 1998).
165. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. Id.
167. One scholar argues this may be difficult because “although judges are expected to
be impartial, they too are susceptible to bias, including homophobia.” Mison, supra note 1, R
at 163. Recall also the quote that began this Comment: Broward Circuit Judge Daniel Futch, in
a case where a gay man was beaten to death outside a gay bar: “That’s a crime now, to beat up a
homosexual?” The prosecutor: “Yes, sir. And it’s a crime to kill them.” Judge Futch: “Times really have
changed.” Id.
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IV. Do We Really Want to Consider These Actions
“Reasonable”?
Many argue the reasonable man does not kill.168 Professor
Dressler counters that while the reasonable man does not kill, he
should be partially excused in a situation where other law-abiding peo-
ple might also lose control.169 He contends that an unwanted sexual
advance is a basis for such justifiable indignation.170 It is quite a leap
from experiencing justifiable indignation resulting from being ap-
proached sexually to killing that person in a rage. Although partially
excusing a killing precipitated by violence is an acceptable proposi-
tion, partially excusing a murderous reaction to non-violent amorous
or sexual advance is not.
Scholars disagree as to whether the NHA defense rests on excuse
or justification. Professor Dressler argues the defense is based on ex-
cuse.171 “To say . . . conduct is justified is to suggest that something
which ordinarily would be considered wrong . . . is, in light of the
circumstances, socially acceptable or tolerable. A justification, in other
words, negates the social harm of an offense.”172 Alternatively, one
who claims excuse is essentially claiming that although he has done
something wrong, he is not blameworthy nor criminally culpable.173
By employing a provocation defense, the defendant is claiming the
victim’s wrongful behavior caused his own death, and so the defen-
dant should not be held to blame.174 It follows that when a jury finds
conduct to be partially excused, they still attach some blame to the
defendant’s actions. In NHA cases, the manslaughter instruction gives
the jury permission to partially excuse the defendant for murdering a
man who made a sexual advance upon him. The jury still places blame
on the defendant by convicting him of manslaughter,175 but finds his
actions partially excusable because of their personal views about the
wrongness of the victim’s actions.
Judges should not instruct juries to consider whether the NHA is
adequate provocation. Not only does this provide an opportunity for
168. See, e.g., Mison, supra note 1. R
169. Dressler, supra note 163, at 755. R
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the Litera-
ture, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1161 (1987).
173. Id. at 1162–63.
174. Mison, supra note 1, at 146. R
175. Meaning the defendant acted with the intent to kill but without malice. CAL. PE-
NAL CODE. § 192 (West 2008).
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biased or homophobic jurors to empathize with the defendant,176 but
also the availability of the instructions can also cloud the jury’s percep-
tion of what is reasonable. The reasonable man standard can be diffi-
cult to apply. It is not for the jury to ask what they personally would
have done in a situation. Rather, they must ask what the “reasonable”
person would have done had that person been in the defendant’s situ-
ation. “The reasonable man is an ideal, reflecting the standard to
which society wants its citizens and system of justice to aspire. It is an
entity whose life is said to be the public embodiment of rational be-
havior.”177 “The argument is not that the ordinary person would not be
provoked by a homosexual advance, but rather that a reasonable per-
son should not be provoked to kill by such an advance.”178
Dressler argues the “reasonable man” should be viewed more like
the ordinary man, subject to human weakness.179 However, it is the
province of the law to choose how to define the reasonable person
standard. The law has chosen to hold people to a standard that is
“sensitive to human weakness, [but] does not excuse extreme charac-
ter flaws.”180 When faced with a NHA defense, the standard must be
that of a person with an average disposition; one who is not racist,
prejudiced, or homophobic.181 Therefore, the law must be that vio-
lence and murder is an unreasonable reaction to a non-violent homo-
sexual advance. Judges must refrain from sending the manslaughter
instruction to the jury without evidence of a violent provocation.
Conclusion
The California legislature could pass laws defining adequate prov-
ocation; however, this is unlikely to happen.182 For over 100 years, ju-
ries have decided what acts constitute legally adequate provocation.
The most likely and efficient way to end the use and success of the
176. Mison, supra note 1, at 161–63. R
177. Id. at 160–61 (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. Id. at 161.
179. Dressler, supra note 163, at 753. R
180. Id. at 757.
181. Id.
182. Consider one Article’s reasoning on the staying power of the related HPD
defense:
The fact that the defense has not been rejected out of hand by the courts and
legislatures may suggest that it appeals to the bias of many individuals, including
judges, against gays. There can be little doubt that a “black panic” or a “sexual
panic” defense would be dismissed quickly by the court system.
Bagnall et al., supra note 39, at 515. R
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NHA defense is for the courts to require sufficient evidence of a vio-
lently provocative act.
Allowing judges to send the manslaughter instruction to the jury
sends the message that murder is a reasonable response to non-violent
stimuli. One scholar stated succinctly: “[k]illing another person in re-
sponse to a homosexual advance is a disproportionate and therefore
an unreasonable response. Society should demand self-control on the
part of individuals who are moved to react violently to such ad-
vances.”183 Some have argued for a complete judicial bar to both the
HPD and NHA defenses because the manslaughter instruction is only
appropriate in the event that a violent act by the provoker does stir
the heat of passion in a defendant. For that reason, judges should
never, as a matter of law, send the manslaughter instruction to the
jury on evidence of a non-violent homosexual advance.
183. Mison, supra note 1, at 172. R
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